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and some cooking – exemplify aspects of functional precautionary
ritualbehavior. Thisminor caveataside, B&L havepowerfullyillu-
minated underlying commonalities in ritual behavior.
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Abstract: In conﬂating opposing meanings of the term “ritual,” arising
from historical Western cultural conﬂicts regarding church and state,
this target article begs fundamental questions. Its appeals to cognitive
science concepts such as “working memory” are poorly informed and
obfuscate what could have been a far more penetrating and less biased
discussion of stereotyped human action.
In English, it is not unusual for the same word to come to possess
two almost opposite meanings – for example, the word “sanc-
tion” – which require careful distinction. The term “ritual” is
similar, denoting pointless actions and also those with great
meaning for participants. Boyer & Lienard (B&L) (and Cosmides
and Tooby, whom they acknowledge as inspirations for this
study) seem tohave beenfoxed by this etymological quirk. Other-
wise, their use of the term “ritual” to refer simultaneously to both
opposite meanings might be regarded as disingenuous.
Much ethnography has been devoted to teasing out authentic
interpretations of the rituals that are found universally in every
culture (even those of university academics). Cultural anthropol-
ogists’ deﬁnitions of the term “ritual” are indeed vague, for excel-
lent reasons. Because the meanings of rituals aregenerally deeply
embedded in the local network of social institutions and collec-
tive representations, which are to a large extent taken for
granted by participants in a given culture, it is often difﬁcult to
ﬁnd simple interpretations for speciﬁc component actions of
any given ritual. For instance, Sperber (1975) found it quite
impossible to understand why members of the tribe he studied
applied butter to their hair. But absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence, as all good scientists are aware.
B&L have adopted their compatriot Sperber’s rationalistic bias
and are content, at least at the outset of their article, to fully
equate cultural ritual with the pathological and apparently irrational
behaviour of humans suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder
(OCD), and with the repetitive actions of small children (who
perhaps delight in their freshly-acquired ability to give order to
their personal space and time). But they do not appear to appreciate
that their deﬁnition of “ritualized behavior” as “stereotypy, rigidity,
repetition and apparent lack of rational motivation” (target article,
sect. 1), applies precisely as well to more approved, adult, and
non-pathological cultural forms such as theatre, music, and poetry.
It is not at all clear how these latter forms might relate to “inferred
threats to ﬁtness” arising from a “Hazard-Precaution System” (as the
authors call it, perhaps using the term “system” to distance them-
selves from Pinker’s wholesale misuse of the term “module”; see,
e.g., Pinker 1997). In any case, cultural ritual clearly serves many
purposes, such as worship, dedication, marking a social commit-
ment, enacting a rite of passage, which it would be ridiculous to
associate with inferred threats to ﬁtness. Ritual is often effective in
these contexts because of its dramatic power, bringing together in
achoreographedandsynergisticprocesssymbolsthathavegreatres-
onance in the cultural understanding of its protagonists (cf. Victor
Turner 1969). Perhaps B&L have had no personal experience of
this power, which would explain how easily they have confused
the two opposite senses of the term “ritual.”
It is also important to stress that religious ritual, like other
performative genres, is rarely rigidly repetitive. On the contrary,
it is often tailored to suit the occasion and/or the individuals
concerned, particularly in rituals that are intended to be curative.
Ritual experts frequently draw from an extended repertoire of
approved variants, as do Western medical practitioners
(e.g., E. L. B. Turner 1992). The relatively invariant form of
the proceedings can easily be seen to provide an acceptable
context or frame (see Goffman 1974) for social actions, enabling
the participants to interpret them appropriately.
Farfrom“swampingworkingmemory,” repetitiveritual actions
are typically easily memorized, and thus rapidly become over-
learned, relieving any potential burden on working memory and
allowing a greater focus on the affective and cognitive content
of the ritual context. The reader should be aware that “swamping
working memory,” a favourite phrase of Boyer, is not an accepted
cognitive science concept – perhaps the authors mean “increased
attentional load” (e.g., Lavie 2006). Over-learning is also a vital
aspect of musical performance. Indeed, humans very often rely
on over-learned behaviours, consciously or unconsciously ﬁtting
themselves into predictable and thus interpretable roles. Ritual
action is thus a particularly striking example of role-play.
Toargue that such adherence tocustom resultsfroma narrowly
deﬁned brain Hazard-Precaution System is question-begging and
has limited explanatory power, like Molie `re’s virtus dormitiva.I n
my view, this aspect of human social behaviour is supported by a
more “domain-general” brain system (or systems!) for planning,
scenario development, and prediction, which uses Bayesian com-
putational algorithms to imaginatively assess the potential beneﬁts
and costs of a range of possible actions. Cognitive scientists are
familiar with this system as the “central executive” (Baddeley
1990; Norman & Shallice 1980). It is obvious that the ability to
acquire, learn, and represent stereotypical patterns for action
greatly increases the efﬁciency of such neural computations by
limiting the range of possibilities, and could thus increase
evolutionary ﬁtness. B&L are tendentious in separating out
actions which they happen to believe are “pointless,” as the
products of a special evolutionary module which could give rise
to the pathological behaviour of patients with OCD.
The appeals to brain science made in this target article are also
unconvincing. The authors ascribe a major role in the production
of ritualized behaviour to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
and ascribe the symptoms of OCD to its defective performance.
However, this is one of the largest anatomically deﬁned cortical
areas, and recent studies (e.g., Chein & Schneider 2005) show
that regions within it support a wide variety of functions, such
as domain-general learning, emotional response, placebo effect,
and internally directed attention. While indeed part of the sub-
genual ACC might possibly support the postulated Hazard-
Precaution System (Van Laere et al. 2006), this area has also
been ﬁrmly implicated in mood disorder (Mayberg et al. 2005).
The functional anatomy of the ACC is an area of intensive
research, and the authors have reached premature conclusions.
Ultimately, B&L reveal their disdain for what quite clearly
gives most of us our major motivation, delight, and satisfaction –
participation in social rituals such as weddings, funerals, christen-
ings, sporting occasions, graduations, and other initiation
ceremonies – by referring to them as a “waste of time” (sect.
9.3). Such an elitist viewpoint undermines the credibility of
much of this article.
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